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COTTAGE SAVINGS ASSOCIATION v.
COMMISSIONER: REFINING THE CONCEPT
OF REALIZATION
LOREN D. PRESCOT, Jr.*
Professor Prescott offers an indepth analysis of the Supreme Court's recent en-
dorsement of the 'materially different' standard-the exchange of property for
other property differing materially either in kind or in extent--as a measure for
realizing income After discussing the Court's endorsement, Professor Prescott
discusses possible applications of the 'legal entitlements' test for evaluating 'mate-
rial differences' to various property exchange transactions; and concludes that
such application may alter the tax treatment of many traditionally tax-free
transactions.
INTRODUCTION
T HE idea that the concept of realization might be subject to doctrines
limiting its application seems inconsistent with the scope of the six-
teenth amendment ("incomes, from whatever source derived").' The
United States Treasury Department, however, supports limiting realiza-
tion in property exchanges to those transactions involving properties
"differing materially either in kind or in extent." 2 Although Treasury
has included this rule in its regulations since 1935, 3 few courts have re-
lied on it to limit realization in property exchange cases.
Recently, the Supreme Court considered Treasury's "materially differ-
ent" limitation on realization in Cottage Savings Association v. Commis-
sioner,4 a case involving the exchange of mortgage loans by savings
institutions. The Court's endorsement of Treasury's "materially differ-
ent" standard suggests that the concept of realization may not be as
broad as once thought.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the concept of realization.
Part II then examines the "materially different" standard by reviewing
* Assistant Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A., 1978, Uni-
versity of Washington; J.D., 1984, Willamette University College of Law; LLM. (Taxa-
tion), 1989, University of Florida College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
the suggestions received from Prof. Michael K. Friel, Prof. John L Gedid, and Loren D.
Prescott, Sr. on earlier drafts of this article. In addition, the author is indebted to Lauri
A.-Olsen, whose comments and research assistance were instrumental in the development
of this article. Finally, for their encouragement, patience, and understanding during the
summer of 1991, heartfelt thanks go to those who matter most: Nancy, Jeffrey, and Mary
Prescott.
1. See infra note 11 for a brief summary of the sixteenth amendment.
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1972).
3. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
4. 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991). The Supreme Court also considered this issue in a com-
panion case, United States v. Centennial Say. Bank FSB, 111 S. Ct. 1512 (1991). Because
the Court based its decision in Centennial on the reasoning announced in Cottage Savings,
this article focuses on the Cottage Savings decision.
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the Cottage Savings decision, the Treasury Department's development of
the standard, and the Supreme Court's other landmark realization deci-
sions. Part III analyzes the Court's reasoning in Cottage Savings, dis-
cussing the justification for placing limits on realization, and Part IV
then analyzes the Court's new "legal entitlements" test and suggests that
use of this new standard to evaluate other types of transactions for "ma-
terial differences" will produce unintended results.
I. THE REALIZATION REQUIREMENT
The Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") provides that gross income
includes "[g]ains derived from dealings in property."5 Although "deal-
ings in property" is not defined within the Code, the word "dealings"
suggests that some action must be taken with respect to property before
the resulting gain constitutes income for purposes of federal income taxa-
tion.6 Gain or loss is "realized" for tax purposes when, as a result of
"dealings in property," the taxpayer's economic gain or loss is isolated
from the underlying capital investment by some event.7 Both the Code'
and the Treasury Regulations9 identify this event as a "sale or other dis-
position" or "sale or exchange." 10
5. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (West Supp. 1986). Unless otherwise indicated, all references
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
6. See 2 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts
40.1, at 40-2 (2d ed. 1990); cf. San Antonio Sav. Ass'n v. Commisioner, 887 F.2d 577, 581-
82 (5th Cir. 1989)("The Code does not define the term 'dealing' and it does not expressly
state that gains and losses are disregarded until an act constituting 'dealing' in property
takes place.").
7. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (adoption of the concept of realiza-
tion through severance of appreciation from capital). It should be noted that although
the concept of realization adopted by the Court in Macomber is applied both to gains and
losses, the decision in Macomber dealt only with gains and their inclusion in income
under the Sixteenth Amendment. As there is no provision in the Constitution dealing
with losses and their effect on income, the allowance of an income tax deduction for a
realized loss is a matter of legislative grace. See I B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxa-
tion of Income, Estates and Gifts 5.2, at 5-20, n.20 (2d ed. 1989).
8. Recently, the Supreme Court confirmed that the concept of realization is implicit
in I.R.C. § 1001(a). See Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1507; see also E. Colson, Federal
Taxation of Sales, Exchanges and Other Transfers 4 (1971) (concluding that requirement
of realization is implicit in the Code).
9. The first regulations promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1913 provided that
gross income includes "appreciation in the value of assets, if taken up on the books of
account as gain." Treas. Reg. No. 33, Pt. III, Art. 107 (1916). When these regulations
were revised in 1918, however, this definition of income was modified: "gain realized...
upon the sale of disposition of capital assets shall be returned as gross income." Treas.
Reg. No. 33, Pt. II, Art. 106 (1918). This appears to be the first use of the term "realiza-
tion" as a means of determining when a taxpayer has income within the meaning of the
sixteenth amendment.
10. The phrases "sale or other disposition" and "sale or exchange" are used inter-
changeably in I.R.C. § 1001 (a),(c). See Helvering v. Roth, 115 F.2d 239, 241 (2d Cir.
1940); see also Del Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001:
The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related Problems of Basis, 26 Buffalo L. Rev.
219, 225-26 (1976) ("sale or other disposition" gains or losses are included in the recogni-
tion provisions for gains or losses from a "sale or exchange" of property). This triggering
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The concept of realization was developed soon after the ratification of
the sixteenth amendment" and the passage of the Tariff Act of 1913.2
Confronted with constitutional and legislative language that failed to de-
fine the "income" on which a federal tax may be imposed, the courts
were forced to establish a framework within which to define income.
The Supreme Court considered the meaning of income in a number of
early cases13 , but its decision in Eisner v. Macomber"4 is recognized as
the Court's first attempt to define the constitutional limits of income. In
Macomber, the Court held unconstitutional a provision in the Revenue
Act of 1916 that treated stock dividends as income.' 5 Noting that the
sixteenth amendment addresses "incomes, from whatever source de-
rived," Justice Pitney wrote that income in the constitutional sense is a
gain, a profit- "something of exchangeable value proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and
coming in, being 'derived,' that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the
taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;--that is income de-
rived from property. Nothing else answers the description."' 6
This requirement of "severance" from capital pronounced by the
Court in Macomber evolved into the concept of realization; that is, ap-
event, often referred to as a "taxable event" or a "realization event," is the subject of
another definition:
[t]he term "taxable event" is a convenient label for a transaction that meets
all of the following conditions: (1) [i]t entails a disposition of property that is
sufficiently definitive so that any appreciation or depreciation is properly viewed
as realized; (2) the transaction is distinguishable from a gift, bequest, division of
ownership, change of contract terms, or other event that alters the taxpayer's
economic position but that for one or more of a variety of reasons does not give
rise to current gain or loss; and (3) it entitles the taxpayer to offset the adjusted
basis of the property against the amount realized therefor in determining
whether the transaction produces gain or loss, and how much.
2 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 40.2, at 40-5 (2d
ed. 1990).
11. The sixteenth amendment, ratified on February 3, 1913 and certified as part of the
Constitution by the Secretary of State on February 25, 1913, provides: "The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration."
12. Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
13. See, e.g., Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1918)(A dividend by a corpo-
ration of shares in another corporation is not a stock dividend and is taxable. Likewise,
cash dividends distributed from current and prior earnings are taxable under the "surtax"
provision.); Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1917)(value of new shares issued as a
stock dividend is not "income" within the meaning of the Income Tax Law of 1913);
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)(" 'Income may be defined as the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.' Understanding the term in
this natural and obvious sense, it cannot be said that a conversion of capital assets invari-
ably produces income."); Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344 (1918)(dividends from
both current earnings and accumulated surplus are taxable as income under "surtax"
provision).
14. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
15. See id. at 219.
16. Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
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preciation in the value of an asset does not constitute income under the
sixteenth amendment in the absence of an event that separates the appre-
ciation from the related capital. 7 In an early tax statute, this "event"
was described as a "sale or other disposition,"'" and this continues to be
the standard used to determine whether appreciation has been converted
into income for federal income taxation purposes. 9 Although the impor-
tance of the "severance" requirement was questioned in a series of cases
following Macomber,z° the concept of realization remains a fixture of the
17. It is well settled that the mere increase in value of property held does not
make taxable income, but that it must be realized by some severance or change
of investment. A money measured sale or an exchange for property having a
readily ascertainable market value is the usual means of realization recognized
by the statutes.
Bancker v.Commissioner, 76 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir.)(citations omitted), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
603 (1935). See also Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, Ill S. Ct. 1519, 1520 (1991) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting)("It long has been established that gain or loss in the value of property
is taken into account for income tax purposes only if and when [it] is 'realized,' that is,
when it is tied to a realization event, such as the sale, exchange, or other disposition of the
property. Mere variation in value-the routine ups and downs of the marketplace-do
not in themselves have income tax consequences.").
18. This phrase was first used in § 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918, a provision that
established guidelines for determining the basis of property. See Revenue Act of 1918,
Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1919). "Sale or other disposition" was
first used in connection with the determination of gain or loss in the Revenue Act of
1924: "the gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the
amount realized therefrom over the basis provided in subdivision (a) or (b) of section 204,
and the loss shall be the excess of such basis over the amount realized." Revenue Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 202(a), 43 Stat. 253, 255 (1924); see also supra note 9 (discus-
sion of Treasury's early interpretation of the term "gross income").
19. But see, e.g., I.R.C. § 1256(a) (1991) (annual appreciation or depreciation in the
value of unsold regulated futures contracts treated as income or loss for tax purposes).
The regulations also provide that gain may be recognized, even in the absence of a sale or
other disposition, "if the sum of all the amounts received which are required by section
1016 and other applicable provisions of subtitle A of the Code to be applied against the
basis of the property exceeds such basis." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(c) (as amended in
1972). This departure from the "sale or other disposition" benchmark does not apply to
losses, however:
[A] loss is not ordinarily sustained prior to the sale or other disposition of the
property, for the reason that until such sale or other disposition occurs there
remains the possibility that the taxpayer may recover or recoup the adjusted
basis of the property. Until some identifiable event fixes the actual sustaining of
a loss and the amount thereof, it is not taken into account.
Id.
20. Erosion of the concept of "severance" began with the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), that a corporation realized income
when it purchased its own bonds at a discount. In response to the taxpayer's argument
that the gain inherent in the transaction was not yet severed from it's investment in the
bonds, the Court said: "We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial defini-
tions. The defendant in error has realized within the year an accession to income, if we
take words in their plain popular meaning, as they should be taken here." Id. at 3.
The trend continued with the Court's opinion in Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461
(1940), a case that considered the question whether a landlord who repossessed property
realized income to the extent the value of the property was enhanced by improvements
made by the tenant. Noting that the "gain" was not yet severed from the landlord's
investment, the Court held the "[i]t is not necessary to recognition of taxable gain that he
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Federal Income Tax System.2'
II. THE "MATERIALLY DIFFERENT" STANDARD
Section 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the compu-
tation of gain or loss on the sale or other disposition of property.' The
Treasury Regulations promulgated pursuant to that provision state that
"gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from
the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in
kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained."'  Although
the decisions in a number of early property exchange cases were based on
an application of this regulation,24 there remained some question about
the validity of such a limitation on realization until the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Cottage Savings.2 5
A. Cottage Savings
Cottage Savings Association was a state-chartered mutual savings as-
sociation. Like many other savings and loan institutions, Cottage Sav-
ings experienced financial trouble in the late seventies when a dramatic
increase in interest rates forced it to pay more in interest to account and
certificate holders than it earned on low-interest fixed term mortgage
should be able to sever the improvement begetting the gain from his original capital. If
that were necessary, no income could arise from the exchange of property; whereas such
gain has always been recognized as realized taxable gain." Id. at 469.
In 1940, the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of the term "income" in Commis-
sioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), when it held that "no single, conclusive criterion
has yet been found to determine in all situations what is a sufficient gain to support the
imposition of an income tax. No more can be said in general than that all relevant facts
and circumstances must be considered." Id. at 407. The Court completed its expansion
of the meaning of "income" in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426
(1955), when it held that income includes any "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Id. at 431.
21. See I B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 5.2,
at 5-17 (2d ed. 1989) ("realization is so basic to the structure of the law that the principle
is not challenged").
22. Section 1001(a) provides as follows:
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the
amount realized over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determin-
ing gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such
section for determining loss over the amount realized.
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1991).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1972) (emphasis added).
24. See eg., Emery v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 1948) (predecessor to
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a), Treas. Reg. § 29.111-1 imposed a "materially different" re-
quirement on the exchange of bonds for bonds); Mutual Loan & Say. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 184 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1950) ("materially different" requirement used in
bond for bond exchange transaction pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 29.111-1); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Hoey, 52 F. Supp. 665, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (Treas. Reg. No. 86,
Art. 111-1 imposed a "materially different" limitation on realization in bond for bond
exchange).
25. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 374 (1988), re "d, 890 F.2d 848
(6th Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
1991]
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loans. 6 Although the resulting decline in the value of residential mort-
gage loans seemed to offer Cottage Savings an opportunity to recognize
losses for tax purposes and thereby improve its cash position by claiming
the resulting income tax refunds, applicable net worth requirements es-
tablished by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") prevented
the savings association from liquidating its mortgage loan investments.
27
The FHLBB, however, recognizing the restrictions placed on savings in-
stitutions by its net worth and reporting requirements, issued Memoran-
dum R-49, a directive that relieved an institution of its obligation to
report losses incurred by the sale of mortgage loans, provided that the
institution satisfied the Memorandum's ten requirements.28
Relying on the guidelines set forth in Memorandum R-49, Cottage
Savings engaged in a series of transactions in 1980, selling 90% participa-
tion interests in 252 mortgage loans to four other savings and loan as-
sociations while simultaneously purchasing 90% participation interests
in 305 similar mortgage loans from those four savings and loans.29 These
transactions met the criteria established by Memorandum R-49 and
26. 890 F.2d at 849.
27. 90 T.C. at 374-75.
28. Memorandum R-49, which was issued by the Director of the Office of Examina-
tion and Supervision (OES) of the FHLBB on June 27, 1980, contained the following
synopsis: "A LOSS NEED NOT BE RECORDED FROM 'RECIPROCAL SALES'
OF SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL MORTGAGE LOANS." The Memorandum
provided, in part, as follows:
The purpose of this memorandum is to advise OES staff on the proper ac-
counting for reciprocal sales of mortgage loans.
A loss resulting from a difference between market value and book value in
connection with reciprocal sales of substantially identical mortgage loans need
not be recorded. Mortgage loans are considered substantially identical only
when each of the following criteria is met. The loans involved must:
1. involve single-family residential mortgages,
2. be of similar type (e.g., conventionals for conventionals),
3. have the same stated terms to maturity (e.g., 30 years),
4. have identical stated interest rates,
5. have similar seasoning (i.e., remaining terms to maturity),
6. have aggregate principal amounts within the lesser of 21/2% or
$100,000 (plus or minus) on both sides of the transaction, with any
additional consideration being paid in cash,
7. be sold without recourse,
8. have similar fair market values,
9. have similar loan-to-value ratios at the time of the reciprocal sale, and
10. have all security properties for both sides of the transaction in the
same state.
Id.
29. See Cottage Savings, 890 F.2d at 849. The sale of 90% participation interests
allowed Cottage Savings to maintain a relationship with the customers whose loans were
exchanged by retaining loan documents and processing monthly loan payments.
Although most of the mortgage swap cases involved the exchange of 90% participation
interests, one case, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 230
(W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989), considered the exchange of a
taxpayer's complete interest in mortgage loans. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that this difference was not sufficient to differentiate Temple from the other mortgage
swap cases. See Temple, 887 F.2d at 594 (comparing the facts in Temple to the 90%
[Vol. 60
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therefore were not reported to the FHLBB as losses affecting net worth.30
Cottage Savings did, however, report the losses sustained on these sales
on its 1980 federal income tax return as deductible losses a.3  The Internal
Revenue Service challenged the taxpayer's position, arguing that the
transaction did not result in a realized loss because the mortgage loans
exchanged were not "materially different." '32
The Supreme Court began its review of Cottage Savings by observing
that a taxpayer must engage in a sale or other disposition of property in
order to realize gain or loss. 33 The Court noted that the Internal Reve-
nue Code places no "materially different" limitation on the concept of
realization, but it nevertheless held that an exchange of properties is an
"other disposition" only if the properties exchanged are materially differ-
ent.34 The Court's endorsement of Treasury's "materially different" re-
quirement as a reasonable interpretation of statutory language was
influenced both by the history of the regulation and by a series of
Supreme Court cases described by the Cottage Savings Court as "our
landmark precedents on realization., 35
The Court noted that the "sale or other disposition" language cur-
rently found in Section 1001(a) was first included in the revenue laws in
1924 and has not been changed since, despite numerous revisions in the
law.36 Recognizing that the regulation which interprets this provision
also has remained unchanged since its promulgation in 1935, the Court
held that the regulation was entitled to judicial deference. 7
participation interests exchanged in a similar case, San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, 887 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1989)).
30. Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 384 (1988), rev'd, 890 F.2d
848 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
31. 890 F.2d at 849. Cottage Savings claimed it was entitled to an income tax refund
in excess of $677,000 as a result of these exchanges. See id.
32. 90 T.C. at 385. In its brief, the government cited two recent Revenue Rulings in
support of its position. See 111 S. Ct. at 1509 n.7 (citing Rev. Rul. 85-125, 1985-2 C.B.
180 and Rev. Rul. 81-204, 1981-2 C.B. 157, both of which hold that the exchange, or
simultaneous purchase and sale, of pools of mortgage loans that do not differ materially
either in kind or in extent, does not result in realized gain or loss).
33. Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1507. The taxpayer in Cottage Savings argued that
the mortgage swap transactions should be characterized as unrelated sales and purchases.
The Tax Court disagreed, holding that the interdependent nature of the transactions
compelled it to treat the transaction as an exchange for federal income tax purposes. See
Cottage Savings, 90 T.C. at 386-87. Other courts reached the same conclusion in connec-
tion with their consideration of mortgage swap transactions. See San Antonio Say. Ass'n
v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1989) (interdependency of transactions
justified characterization as exchange); Centennial Say. Bank FSB v. United States, 682
F.Supp. 1389, 1396 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.
1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 111 S. Ct. 1512 (199 1) (interdependency of transactions
justified characterization as exchange).
34. Cottage Savings, I11 S. Ct. at 1508.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. In so doing, the Court applied a concept known as the reenactment rule: "As
we have recognized, 'Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are
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The Court also relied on its line of reorganization cases, decided in the
twenties, as justification for its adoption of the "materially different" lim-
itation on realization.3" The Court cited United States v. Phellis,39 Weiss
v. Stearn," and United States v. Marr4 for the proposition that a tax-
payer realizes gain or loss only if the properties exchanged are "materi-
ally" or "essentially" different.42 The Court concluded that the
principles of realization previously developed in these cases are now in-
corporated in the realization requirement as codified in Section 1001(a),43
and that Treasury's interpretation of this statutory language in a manner
consistent with the holdings in these cases must therefore be
reasonable.'
Having established a limitation on realization of gain or loss, it re-
mained for the Supreme Court to determine whether the interests ex-
changed by Cottage Savings satisfied the Court's "materially different"
standard. The Court refused to adopt the "economic substitute" test ad-
vanced by the government, 45 choosing instead to focus on whether the
legal entitlements that accompanied the exchanged mortgages were dif-
ferent in kind or extent.46 The Court held that the mortgage loans re-
ceived by Cottage Savings provided it with legal entitlements different
from those enjoyed prior to the exchange because the loans received were
made to different obligors and were secured by different parcels of prop-
erty. Concluding that the loans exchanged were thus "materially differ-
ent" because of differences in these legal entitlements, the Court
permitted a deduction for the resulting realized lOSS.4 7
deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law.'" Id. (citing
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967), quoting Helvering v. Winmill, 305
U.S. 79, 83 (1938)). For a brief discussion of the reenactment rule, see infra note 109.
38. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, IlI S. Ct. 1503, 1508 (1991).
39. 257 U.S. 156 (1921). See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case.
40. 265 U.S. 242 (1924). See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case.
41. 268 U.S. 536 (1925). See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case.
42. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503, 1508 (1991).
43. The Court explained its rationale with the following language:
[b]ecause these decisions were part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which
Congress enacted § 202(a) of the 1924 Act, and because Congress has left undis-
turbed through subsequent reenactments of the Code the principles of realiza-
tion established in these cases, we may presume that Congress intended to
codify these principles in § 1001(a).
Id. at 1508-09 (citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the govern-
ment's economic substitute theory.
46. Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1511.
47. See id. The Court's decision reversed the Sixth Circuit, which held that although
losses incurred by Cottage Savings were realized because the loans exchanged were "ma-
terially different," the resulting losses were not deductible under I.R.C. § 165(a) because
they were not "sustained during the taxable year" as required by the statute. Cottage
Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848, 855 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded,
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As the Court noted, the "materially different" requirement originated
with the Treasury Department's promulgation of interpretive regulations
on the subject in 1934.48 Given the importance of this regulation to the
Court's decision in Cottage Savings, any analysis of the realization re-
quirement and its possible limitations must begin with a review of the
regulation's history and of the cases cited by the Court in support of
Treasury's "materially different" requirement.
B. The Treasury Regulations
As the Supreme Court noted in Cottage Savings, current Treasury
Regulations provide that "the gain or loss realized from the conversion
of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other prop-
erty differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income
or as loss sustained."49 Although this language was first included in the
regulations in 1935, Treasury addressed the issue of realization much
earlier with the promulgation of regulations pursuant to Section 202(b)
of the Revenue Act of 1918, a provision that treated property received in
an exchange as the equivalent of cash for purposes of determining gain or
loss." Treasury's interpretation of this section of the Act appeared the
following year:
Gain or loss arising from the acquisition and subsequent disposition of
property is realized when as the result of a transaction between the
owner and another person the property is converted into cash or into
property (a) that is essentially different from the property disposed of,
and (b) that has a market value. In other words, both (a) a change in
substance and not merely in form, and (b) a change into the equivalent
of cash, are required to complete or close a transaction from which
income may be realized.51
Treasury's adoption of this "essentially different" requirement was ap-
parently based on the concept of substance over form, given the reference
to this concept in both the regulations and the legislative history of Sec-
tion 202(b).-2 Reliance on congressional intent may have been mis-
placed, however, because the legislative history of Section 202(b) suggests
111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991). While the Supreme Court offered no explanation for its disagree-
ment with the Sixth Circuit on this issue, it did note that the government raised this issue
on appeal in a one-sentence footnote to its brief. See Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1511-
12. This suggests that the issue might have received more attention from the Court if the
government had offered a better argument in favor of the Sixth Circuit's conclusion.
48. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, II S. CL 1503, 1508.
49. Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1972)).
50. Section 202(b) provided that "[w]hen property is exchanged for other property,
the property received in exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss be
treated as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any." Revenue
Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919).
51. Treas. Reg. No. 45, Art. 1563, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 393 (1919).
52. The Senate Finance Committee Report on section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of
1918 contained an indirect reference to the concept of substance over form. For an ex-
cerpt from the text of this report, see infra note 53.
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that lawmakers' concern with substance over form was limited to reor-
ganization transactions. 53
The "essentially different" standard appeared in an amended version
of the same regulation in 1920,"4 and again in 1922 when the regulations
were repromulgated.5 The property exchange provision was subse-
quently eliminated from the regulations, however, presumably in re-
sponse to changes made by lawmakers in the Revenue Act of 1924 with
respect to the realization of gain or loss. 56 No reference to the tax treat-
ment of property exchanges appeared in the regulations again until
1935. 5 7
53. A proviso following the general rule in section 202(b) added that no gain or loss
shall be deemed to occur from the exchange in those transactions involving a reorganiza-
tion, merger, or consolidation of a corporation. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No.
65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919). The following excerpt from the legislative
history provides some useful background on this provision (the predecessor of a current
nonrecognition provision, I.R.C. § 354):
A provision was inserted designed to establish the rule for determining taxable
gains in the case of exchanges of property and to negative the assertion of tax in
the case of certain purely paper transactions. The substance of this provision is
that when property is exchanged for other property the property received in
exchange shall be treated as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair
market value, but when in connection with the reorganization or consolidation
of a corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him
new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par value, or when a person
receives in place of property stock of a corporation formed to take over such
property, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange.
S. Rep. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6 (1919) (emphasis added). Given the lengthy
discussion of the tax consequences of a reorganization in the Senate Report, it appears
that the Report's reference to "purely paper transactions" may have been limited to reor-
ganizations. It is interesting to note that while the reference in section 202(b) to "gain or
loss deemed to occur" made no distinction between realized and recognized gain, Treas-
ury's "essentially different" requirement did so by clearly limited realization. See supra
text accompanying note 51.
54. Treas. Dec. 2971, 22 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 19 (1920).
55. Treas. Reg. No. 62, Art. 1564, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 207, 498 (1922).
56. In 1924, the Congress changed the approach previously taken with respect to
gains and losses by eliminating the provision limiting realization whenever the fair mar-
ket value of the property received was uncertain. See supra text accompanying note 5 1.
The 1924 Act provided that "gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be
the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the basis [of the property]." Revenue
Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 202(a), 43 Stat. 253, 255 (1924).
In a brief filed with the Supreme Court, Cottage Savings suggested that "[tjhe 1920
regulation was inconsistent with Congress' intent to create a rule of certainty in Section
203; thus, it was properly abandoned." Brief for Petitioner at Part II.A.3 of the Argu-
ment, Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965).
The Treasury Department also may have removed its guidelines on property exchanges
from the regulations in the early twenties because of a perceived conflict with the tests
announced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921), and
Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924). If correct, this would explain why a provision
addressing exchange transactions reappeared after consideration of the issue was com-
pleted by the Supreme Court in Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
57. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. No. 65, Art. 1561, (1924)(discussing exchange of "like kind"
property); Treas. Reg. No. 74, Art. 561, (1930)(same); Treas. Reg. No. 77, Art. 561,
(1934)(same).
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In 1935, Treasury promulgated regulations pursuant to the Revenue
Act of 1934. Those regulations addressed the question of realization in
property exchanges with the following language: "Except as otherwise
provided, the Internal Revenue Code regards as income or as loss sus-
tained, the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into
cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing mate-
rially either in kind or in extent."58 This language has remained virtually
unchanged since its original adoption by the Treasury Department in
1935.59
Treasury's adoption of the "materially different" standard in 1935 re-
mains a mystery. Since the standard's adoption, Treasury has not dis-
cussed its origin and has offered no definition of "materially different."
Despite the uneasy footing of Treasury's standard, however, the Supreme
Court suggested in Cottage Savings that Treasury's limitation on realiza-
tion does find support in a series of Supreme Court cases dealing with the
tax consequences of corporate reorganizations.
C. The Reorganization Cases
Following its landmark decision in Eisner v. Macomber,6" the Court
considered a series of stock-for-stock exchange cases that were subse-
quently relied upon by the Court in Cottage Savings when it adopted the
"materially different" limitation on realization.
The first of these cases, United States v. Phellis,6" involved a taxpayer
who owned 250 shares of the common stock of E.I. du Pont de Nemours
Powder Company, a New Jersey corporation.6" Pursuant to a reorgani-
zation plan, the company transferred substantially all of its assets to a
newly-formed Delaware corporation in exchange for approximately half
of the new corporation's authorized capital stock.63 The New Jersey cor-
poration then distributed Delaware corporation stock on a pro rata basis
to the taxpayer and all other New Jersey corporation shareholders as a
"dividend." ' The taxpayer was not required to relinquish his shares in
the New Jersey corporation.65 The New Jersey corporation continued in
existence but conducted no further business.66
58. Treas. Reg. No. 86, Art. 111-1 (1934).
59. This language later appeared in regulations under the Revenue Act of 1936,
Treas. Reg. No. 94, Art. 111-1, and regulations issued under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, Treas. Reg. § 19.111-1. Almost identical language currently appears in Treas.
Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1972). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
60. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 14-19 and
accompanying text.
61. 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
62. Id. at 165-66.
63. Id. at 166. As partial consideration for the transfer of its operating assets, the
New Jersey corporation retained approximately S1.5 million in cash which it in turn used
to redeem its 5% mortgage bonds. See id.
64. 257 U.S. at 166.
65. Id. at 167.
66. Id.
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In an opinion authored by Justice Pitney, the Court held that because
stock in the Delaware corporation was held by the New Jersey corpora-
tion in recognition of the transfer of assets to the new corporation, that
stock constituted an asset of the New Jersey corporation which, when
distributed to its shareholders, resulted in a severance of a portion of the
taxpayer's investment in the New Jersey corporation.67 In applying this
concept of severance-which, as the Court noted, was adopted in Eisner
v. Macomber61- the Phellis Court concluded that:
when this common stock was distributed among the common stock-
holders of the old company as a dividend, then at once-unless the two
companies must be regarded as substantially identical-the individual
stockholders of the old company, including claimant, received assets of
exchangeable and actual value severed from their capital interest in the
old company, proceeding from it as the result of a division of former
corporate profits, and drawn by them severally for their individual and
separate use and benefit.69
Noting that the corporations were chartered in different states and that
the interests of existing stockholders in the business were significantly
diluted as a result of the transaction,70 the Court held that the two corpo-
rations were not substantially identical, 7' and that thus the stock re-
ceived by the taxpayer must be characterized as income.72 Specifically,
the Court concluded:
In the light of all this we cannot regard the new company as virtually
identical with the old, but must treat it as a substantial corporate body
with its own separate identity, and its stockholders as having property
rights and interests materially different from those incident to owner-
ship of stock in the old company.73
The Court relied on Phellis when it refused to limit realization in two
subsequent cases, Rockefeller v. United States74  and Culinan v.
Walker,75 both involving facts similar to those in Phellis.7 1 Both deci-
sions were based on the approach taken in Phellis: the stock received by
67. Id. at 170.
68. 257 U.S. at 169.
69. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
70. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 89.
71. See Phellis, 257 U.S. at 173. The Court observed that the authorized capital of
the new corporation was nearly four times that of the old corporation, with less than half
of the new shares issued to the existing shareholders. This left "the future disposition of a
majority of the authorized new issues still to be determined," according to the Court. Id.
72. Id. at 175.
73. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
74. 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
75. 262 U.S. 134 (1923).
76. In Rockefeller, the stockholders of Prairie Oil & Gas Company, a Kansas corpo-
ration, organized a new Kansas corporation for the purpose of operating Prairie's pipe-
line business. The stock of the new corporation was distributed, pro rata, to the
stockholders of Prairie. See Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 181. In Cullinan, the trustee ap-
pointed to oversee the liquidation of a corporation formed two Texas corporations for the
purpose of operating the business of the liquidated corporation. The stock of these two
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the taxpayer was held by the distributing corporation as a substitute for
assets which, when distributed to the stockholder, resulted in the realiza-
tion of income.77 Although there is no mention in these later decisions of
the "substantially identical" or "materially different" standards adopted
by the Court in Phellis, the Court's discussion of factors distinguishing
the corporations involved in these cases, together with the reliance placed
on Phellis, suggest that the absence of "substantially identical" corpora-
tions was instrumental in these decisions.7
The Court reached a different result, however, in Weiss v. Steam."
The taxpayer in Weiss held stock in National Acme Manufacturing Com-
pany, an Ohio corporation. 0 Pursuant to a written agreement, all of the
assets, contracts, and liabilities of the company were transferred to a new
Ohio corporation formed for the purpose of conducting the business of
National Acme."1 The new corporation transferred all of its authorized
and outstanding stock to a trust company in consideration for the receipt
of National Acme's business.8 2 The taxpayer and all other shareholders
of National Acme exchanged their shares through the trust company for
cash (contributed by new investors) and stock of the new corporation. 3
Finally, National Acme was liquidated.84 The government characterized
the transaction as a sale by each shareholder of his interest in the old
corporation for cash and newly-issued stock."
Writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds held that the Court's deci-
sion in Phellis did not apply to the stock-for-stock exchange in Weiss.
Although the Court acknowledged that the taxpayer realized gain on
that portion of the stock exchanged for cash, it concluded that because
National Acme did not segregate its assets and distribute them to its
shareholders in the form of stock, as was done by du Pont of New Jersey
in Phellis, the exchange of stock for stock was not a taxable event.8 6
corporations was issued to a newly-formed Delaware corporation which was wholly-
owned by the trustee. See Cullinan, 262 U.S. at 136.
77. See Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 183-84; Cullinan, 262 U.S. at 137-38.
78. See Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 183-84; Cullinan, 262 U.S. at 137-38.
79. 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
80. See id. at 251.
81. See id.
82. See Weiss, 265 U.S. at 251.
83. See id. at 252.
84. See id. at 251.
85. See id. at 252.
86. See id. at 252-53 (suggesting that the decisions in Phellis and Rockefeller did not
apply to the facts of Weiss). The Weiss Court also concluded that the decision reached in
Cullinan was not controlling because that case involved the receipt of stock in a holding
company that did not hold title to the assets of the old company and did not carry on the
business of the old company. See id.
Although not highlighted by the Court, there are two other significant factual differ-
ences between Phellis and Weiss that arguably justify the result reached by the Weiss
Court. First, the National Acme stock was surrendered to a trust company, leaving the
impression that the new shares received by the taxpayer were intended to act as a substi-
tute for the investment represented by the old shares. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242,
251-52 (1923). In other words, the Weiss case did not involve a distribution of assets
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Rather than deciding, as it did in Phellis, whether or not the two cor-
porations were "substantially identical," the Weiss Court focused exclu-
sively on the nature of the interest received by the taxpayer. Thus, the
Court held that:
[the Court] can not conclude that mere change for purposes of reor-
ganization in the technical ownership of an enterprise, under circum-
stances like those here disclosed, followed by issuance of new
certificates, constitutes gain separated from the original capital inter-
est. Something more is necessar--something which gives the stock-
holder a thing really different from what he theretofore had.8 7
Noting that the transaction left the taxpayer with an interest in the en-
terprise identical to the interest relinquished,88 the Court held that the
exchange did not result in realized gain or loss.8 9
The last of the reorganization cases, Marr v. United States,90 involved
the decision of General Motors of New Jersey to reincorporate in the
state of Delaware. 91 Pursuant to a reorganization plan, the taxpayer re-
linquished his stock in the New Jersey corporation and in exchange re-
made with respect to the taxpayer's investment in another corporation, as was the case in
Phellis. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 170 (1921). Second, the plan of reor-
ganization in Weiss included the liquidation of National Acme, while the plan in Phellis
did not contemplate a liquidation of the old corporation. See Weiss, 265 U.S. at 251-52;
Phellis, 257 U.S. at 167. Thus, the transaction in Phellis left the taxpayer with two differ-
ent assets: New Jersey corporation stock and Delaware corporation stock. The Court's
decision in Weiss clearly was influenced by the fact that the reorganization transaction
did not leave the taxpayer with two different property interests as did the transaction in
Phellis. See Weiss, 265 U.S. at 254; Phellis, 257 U.S. at 173.
87. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924) (emphasis added). It is interesting to
note that the Court cites three cases in support of this conclusion, none of which directly
endorse the test adopted by the Court in Weiss. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 426-
27 (1918) (some change in a shareholder's interest is required for the transaction to con-
stitute an exchange); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 336 (1918) (some change
in shareholder interest required); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71 (1918) (no
mention of change in interest in Court's opinion).
88. Weiss, 265 U.S. at 254.
89. Id. The Court's holding was limited to that portion of the taxpayer's interest that
was maintained in the form of stock. See id. The Court agreed that gain was realized to
the extent that the taxpayer received cash in exchange for stock held in the old corpora-
tion. See id. at 252.
Speculating on the results of a hypothetical transfer, the Weiss Court stated that:
[i]f upon the transfer of its entire property and business for the purpose of reor-
ganization and future conduct the old corporation had actually received the
entire issue of new stock and had then distributed this pro rata among its stock-
holders, their ultimate rights in the enterprise would have continued substan-
tially as before - the capital assets would have remained unimpaired and
nothing would have gone therefrom to any stockholder for his separate benefit.
The value of his holdings would not have changed, and he would have retained
the same essential rights in respect of the assets.
Id. at 253 (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the potential dilution of the interests
held by the shareholders in the business of du Pont of New Jersey was a key factor in the
Court's decision in Phellis.
90. 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
91. See id. at 538-39.
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ceived stock in the newly-formed Delaware corporation. 92 All of the
assets and liabilities of the New Jersey corporation were transferred to
the Delaware corporation, and the New Jersey corporation was subse-
quently liquidated.93
The Marr Court began by noting that although each of the reorganiza-
tion cases previously considered by the Court dealt with businesses that
were not changed by the transaction in question, the three cases which
characterized stock distributions as income (Phellis, Rockefeller, and
Cullinan) involved transactions resulting in a change in corporate iden-
tity.94 Noting that no change in identity occurred in the other two reor-
ganization cases, Weiss and Macomber," the Court concluded that the
disparate results reached in these two sets of cases justified its focus on
the change in corporation identity.96
Citing state of incorporation as the key factor, the Marr Court held
that the Delaware corporation was "essentially different" from the New
Jersey corporation. The Court stated that:
[a] corporation organized under the laws of Delaware does not have
the same rights and powers as one organized under the laws of New
Jersey. Because of these inherent differences in rights and powers,
both the preferred and the common stock of the old corporation is an
essentially different thing from the stock of the same general kind in
the new.97
Although the Court assigned some significance to the nature of the inter-
ests exchanged by the taxpayer,98 as it did in Weiss,99 it relied primarily
on the fact that the two corporations were formed in different states."
92. Id. at 538.
93. Id. at 539.
94. Id. at 540 (1925). "That is, the corporate property, or a part thereof, was no
longer held and operated by the same corporation; and after the distribution, the stock-
holders no longer owned merely the same proportional interest of the same character in
the same corporation." Id.
95. The Court observed that in Macomber, there was no second corporation involved
in the transaction, and in Weiss, "[t]echnically there was a new entity; but the corporate
identity was deemed to have been substantially maintained because the new corporation
was organized under the laws of the same State, with presumably the same powers as the
old." Id. at 541.
96. See id. at 540-41.
97. Id. at 541.
98. The taxpayer in Marr exchanged 7% voting preferred stock in the New Jersey
corporation for 6% non-voting preferred stock in the Delaware corporation. See Marr v.
United States, 268 U.S. 536, 538 (1925). Although the Court concluded that "[a] 6 per
cent. non-voting preferred stock is an essentially different thing from a 7 per cent. voting
preferred stock," it described this as an "adventitious" difference, "substantial in charac-
ter." Id. at 541.
99. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
100. See Marr, 268 U.S. at 541-42. The Court's reliance on state of incorporation as a
means of distinguishing between its decisions in previous cases was based on the fact that
in Weiss, the only fact pattern involving two corporations chartered in the same state, the
stock received by the taxpayer was treated as a substitute for the stock relinquished. See
Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 253-54 (1924). Interestingly, Justice McReynolds, the
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The Marr Court thus concluded that the taxpayer realized gain upon
receipt of stock in General Motors of Delaware.' '
With the historical development of the "materially different" standard
as background, two questions remain. First, do the early Supreme Court
cases establish the existence of a limitation on the concept of realization?
Second, do they also endorse Treasury's "materiality" test as an appro-
priate method of applying this limitation? These questions will be con-
sidered in the discussion that follows.
III. JUSTIFYING A LIMITATION ON REALIZATION
The concept of realization was developed by the Supreme Court in
Macomber as a means of differentiating between appreciation still a part
of the taxpayer's capital investment and "gain ... received or drawn by
the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal."'' 02
Although the reference in both the sixteenth amendment and section
61(a) of the Code to "income, from whatever source derived" is purpose-
fully broad, the triggering "realization" event must be confined to trans-
actions that fix the appreciation inherent in the asset and isolate it from
the underlying capital investment.'03 Any "sale or other disposition"
will satisfy these requirements and be considered a "taxable event" re-
sulting in the realization of gain or loss.1 4 The question, then, is
whether an exchange of properties will ever fail to qualify as an "other
disposition" and thereby illustrate that the concept of realization is sub-
ject to limitation based on the nature of the transaction.'05
author of the opinion in Weiss, joined in a separate opinion issued in Marr in which he
and three other justices expressed concern over the majority's reliance on state of incor-
poration. In the relevant portion of their separate opinion, the justices stated that:
Weiss v. Steam did not turn upon the relatively unimportant circumstance that
the new and old corporations were organized under the laws of the same State,
but upon the approved definition of income from capital as something severed
therefrom and received by the taxpayer from his separate use and benefit. Here
stockholders got nothing from the old business or assets except new statements
of their undivided interests, and this, as we carefully pointed out, is not enough
to create taxable income.
Mart, 268 U.S. at 542. Based on this explanation of the majority's reasoning in Weiss, it
appears that the Weiss Court would have decided Marr differently. What the minority in
Marr fail to explain is why tax-free treatment is appropriate, given the fact that the trans-
action in Marr left the taxpayer with nonvoting stock, an "essentially different thing"
than the voting stock relinquished in the exchange. See id. at 541.
101. Id. at 541-42.
102. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920)(emphasis in original). See supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
103. In other words, unrealized appreciation is not "income" for purposes of the Six-
teenth Amendment. See supra note 17.
104. In Cottage Savings, the Supreme Court conditioned realization on a sale or other
disposition: "Section 1001(a)'s language provides a straightforward test for realization: to
realize a gain or loss in the value of property, the taxpayer must engage in a 'sale or other
disposition of [the] property.'" Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503,
1507 (1991).
105. In his book Taxable Income, Professor Magill presents another possible limitation
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A. Judicial Support for a Limitation on Realization
The analysis of a property exchange transaction must begin with a re-
view of the substance of the transaction. If an exchange represents a true
"disposition of property," it will result in the realization of gain or
loss.' 0 6 Whether every property exchange transaction should be charac-
terized as a disposition of property is considered below.
The Supreme Court adopted the "materially different" limitation on
realization in Cottage Savings in concluding that, as embodied in Treas-
ury Reg. Section 1.1001-1(a), the limitation was a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the realization requirement implicit in Section 1001(a) of the
Code.10 7 The Court's conclusion was based, in part, on its observation
that the regulation had received Congressional approval through inac-
tion.'S Although the Supreme Court made legitimate use of the "reen-
actment rule" when it adopted Treasury's "materially different" test in
Cottage Savings,"° endorsement of a controversial provision in this man-
on the concept of realization. See R. Magill, Taxable Income 126 (rev. ed. 1945) [herein-
after Magill]. Professor Magill suggests that the open transaction doctrine established by
the Supreme Court in Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), lends support to the position
that a sale or other disposition involving property with no ascertainable fair market value
does not constitute a realization event, because the equivalent of cash has not been re-
ceived. See Magill, supra, at 126.
The revenue laws and supporting Treasury Regulations originally conditioned realiza-
tion on the receipt of property with an ascertainable market value. See Revenue Act of
1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057 (1919); Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No.
98, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227 (1921); Treas. Reg. No. 45, Art. 1563 (1918). See also supra
note 51 and accompanying text. Those guidelines were abandoned in 1924 when Con-
gress statutorily defined "amount realized" to include the fair market value of property
other than money received in a transaction. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-
176, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 253, 255 (1924), discussed supra note 56.
Currently, Treasury takes the position that "[t]he fair market value of property is a
question of fact, but only in rare and extraordinary cases will property be considered to
have no fair market value." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1972). Caselaw
supports Treasury's position by endorsing a method of valuing property which assumes
that, in an arm's length exchange between unrelated parties, the value of property re-
ceived can be determined with reference to the property exchanged. See United States v.
Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d
310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943); Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp.
184, 188-89 (Ct. Cl. 1954). Consequently, it is questionable whether the Cash Equiva-
lence Doctrine is recognized today as a limitation on the concept of realization.
106. See Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1507.
107. Id. at 1508. The circuit courts also endorsed the "materially different" test dur-
ing their consideration of the mortgage swap cases. See San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Com-
missioner, 887 F.2d 577, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1989); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple
v. United States, 887 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1989); Centennial Say. Bank FSB v. United
States, 887 F.2d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 111 S. Ct. 1512
(1991); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd and
remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1503, 1508 (1991); FNMA v. Commissioner, 896 F.2d 580, 583
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
108. See Cottage Savings, I11 S. Ct. at 1508.
109. The reenactment rule is a concept employed by the courts which creates a pre-
sumption in favor of the validity of regulations promulgated by an administrative agency
which interpret a statute that is reenacted without change after issuance of the regula-
tions. See, e.g., Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) ("Treasury regulations and
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ner leaves many questions unanswered.
To its credit, the Court also relied on its "landmark realization cases,"
a body of caselaw that both confirms and justifies the existence of a limi-
tation on the concept of realization."' In Weiss, the Supreme Court held
that a technical change in ownership evidenced by an exchange of essen-
tially identical interests did not constitute "gain separated from the origi-
nal capital interest.""' In so doing, the Court acknowledged that not all
exchange transactions will be treated as realization events for tax
purposes.
Although the Court reached a different result in Phellis and Marr,
these cases also provide support for the existence of a limitation on reali-
zation. In both cases, the Court implicitly acknowledged the existence of
a limitation on realization by comparing the interests exchanged. Just as
similarities between interests justified the result in Weiss, differences be-
tween the interests exchanged in Phellis and Marr justified characteriza-
tion of those transactions as realization events. Although the Phellis and
Marr Courts applied this "materially different" standard primarily at the
corporate level 'z-in contrast to the standard's application at the share-
holder level in Weiss 3-all three decisions reflect the Court's concern
over the differences between the corporations involved in the transactions
and the effects of those differences on the ownership interests held by
stockholders.
While these cases seem to stand together in support of an evaluation of
properties involved in an exchange, some important factual differences
should be noted. In Phellis, the Court applied a "materially different"
test to a corporate distribution transaction." 14 Consequently, the Court's
use of this standard to compare the two corporations involved in the
Phellis transaction should be viewed as a method of characterizing distri-
butions made by a corporation with respect to its stock, and not as a
decision affecting the way in which the concept of realization is applied
in property exchange cases. Although the Court's decision in Marr does
support use of the "materially different" standard in exchange cases, the
interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or
substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and
have the effect of law.").
110. See Cottage Savings, 111 S. Ct. at 1508.
111. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
112. See Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541 (1925); United States v. Phellis, 257
U.S. 156, 175 (1921). Although the Marr Court based its evaluation primarily on differ-
ences between the two corporations involved in the transaction, it also relied on the na-
ture of the equity interests exchanged. See Marr, 268 U.S. 536, 541; supra note 98.
113. Presumably, the Weiss Court chose to focus on the nature of the stock involved in
the exchange because of its conclusion, implicit in its decision and confirmed by the
Court's subsequent decision in Marr, that the two corporations were, in substance, identi-
cal. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
114. See Phellis, 257 U.S. at 168.
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Court's rationale was undermined by the strong dissent in the case.'
Still, Marr supports some limitation on realization in property exchange
transactions, given the Court's decision to evaluate the exchange transac-
tion using a standard based on a comparison of the characteristics of the
properties exchanged." 6 In addition, Marr is cited as authority for the
idea that this limitation on realization also applies to different interests in
the same property." 7 Notwithstanding these differences, these cases
combine to provide convincing justification and support for recognition
of a limitation on the concept of realization based on the nature of the
properties involved in the exchange.
Other courts have properly characterized the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in these cases as an application of the doctrine of sub-
stance over form." 8 As the Court's decision in Weiss illustrates, a trans-
action which in form qualifies as an "other disposition" and therefore
should result in realized gain or loss will not be treated as a disposition if,
in substance, it is merely an exchange of identical property interests.
Thus, it is appropriate to view Phellis, Weiss, and Marr as cases that
establish some limitation on the meaning of realization through an inter-
pretation of "other disposition" and "exchange" as those terms are used
currently in Code Sections 1001(a) and (c). Together, these cases
demonstrate that a transaction which in substance results in the disposi-
tion of an interest in property (rather than a substitution of one interest
for an identical one) will be treated as a taxable event resulting in realized
gain or loss.'" 9 Thus, the early Supreme Court cases suggest that it is
both conceptually and administratively proper to limit realization in
115. For a discussion of the position taken by several justices in a separate opinion in
Marr, see supra note 100.
116. Although the Marr Court relied primarily on differences between the two corpo-
rations to justify its decision, it also noted that the exchange involved the receipt of non-
voting stock for voting stock. See supra note 98. Thus, the reasoning of the Court in
Marr appears similar to that of the Second Circuit in Emery v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d
27 (2d Cir. 1948). In Emery, the court found that a difference in the terms of refinancing
bonds used to replace those originally issued justified realization of income. See id. at 29-
30.
117. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, Ill S. Ct. 1503, 1510 (1991); San
Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 585 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Cir-
cuit in San Antonio rejected the taxpayer's argument that these reorganization cases lim-
ited the application of the "materially different" test to exchanges of different interests in
the same property. See id.
118. See San Antonio, 887 F.2d at 577; Centennial Say. Bank FSB v. United States, 682
F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.
1989), aff'd in part rev'd in part, I11 S. Ct. 1512 (1991). The Supreme Court has recog-
nized the doctrine of substance over form in a number of cases. See, e.g., Deidrich v.
Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 195 (1982) ("[S]ubstance, not the form, of the agreed trans-
action controls."); Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1958)(stating
that the substance of arrangements is determined "not by subtleties of draftmanship but
by their total effect"); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334
(1945)("The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction.").
119. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
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property exchange transactions to those exchanges that are in substance
true dispositions, because such exchanges involve different properties.
B. The Case Against Limitations on Realization
The Supreme Court's opinion in Cottage Savings focused exclusively
on authorities supporting the existence of a limitation on realization, and
omitted any discussion of issues raised by the taxpayer and others. 20
Lower court decisions rendered in Cottage Savings and similar cases did,
however, consider other issues raised by the parties in some detail. A
review of the issues raised by opponents of the "materially different"
standard provides additional perspective on and support for the Supreme
Court's endorsement of the test.
1. Disregarding the Nature of the Properties Exchanged
Naturally, the taxpayers who claimed losses in connection with the
exchange of mortgage loans argued against the use of a "materially dif-
ferent" limitation on realization. Recognizing that these loans, which
qualified as "substantially identical" for purposes of Memorandum R-
49,121 might not qualify as "materially different," the taxpayers argued
that any disposition will trigger realization, regardless of the considera-
tion received in exchange. 122 The trial court in First Federal Savings &
Loan Association of Temple v. United States'23 subscribed to this
approach:
[T]he concept of realization has two distinct, component aspects
which must both be satisfied before a gain or loss is 'realized' for tax
purposes. First, there is the economic (or what can be called the 'com-
mon sense') aspect of realization. That is, 'Has there been an actual
economic gain or loss?' This is generally put in terms of an economic
increase or decrease in a taxpayer's net worth. This aspect has often
been summed up by the famous paraphrase from Eisner v. Macomber,
'Is the taxpayer, in fact, richer or poorer?' Second, there is the practi-
cal accounting aspect of realization. Namely, that for accounting and
valuation purposes the increase or decrease in a taxpayer's net worth
(Le. the value of his assets) will not be accounted for ('realized' as a
practical matter) until there is some 'event that freezes or fixes the gain
with sufficient certainty so that it is proper to tax it .... A taxable
event, under the Code, which suffices to satisfy the second aspect of
realization is a 'sale or other disposition of property' or a 'sale or ex-
120. No amicus briefs were filed in Cottage Savings. In Centennial, amicus briefs were
filed by a number of financial institutions and associations. See United States v. Centen-
nial Sav. Bank FSB, 111 S. Ct. 1512 (1991) (No. 89-1965).
121. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the FHLBB's Memorandum
R-49).
122. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848, 850 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd
and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United
States, 694 F. Supp. 230, 240 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989).
123. 694 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
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change of property.' 2 4
The District Court's literal interpretation of the "sale or other disposi-
tion" requirement in Temple has two faults, however. First, it places
complete responsibility for distinguishing between legitimate and "manu-
factured" transactions on the nonrecognition provisions included in the
Internal Revenue Code. 25 As noted by the Fifth Circuit in San Antonio
Savings Association v. Commissioner,2 ' a similar case heard by the Court
concurrently with appeals in Temple and a third mortgage swap case,
Centennial Savings Bank FSB v. United States,'2 7 such a position is
flawed because it:
places no limits on realization through meaningless exchanges. Reali-
zation of gain or loss would occur if farmer A exchanged 1,000 bushels
of Kansas spring wheat with farmer B for 1,000 bushels of Kansas
spring wheat or if individual C exchanged his 1969 red Ferrari with
individual D's 1969 red Ferrari (of the same model), both of which had
been garaged and never driven. As [San Antonio Savings Association,
the taxpayer here] acknowledges, this doctrine would lead to deduc-
tion of the losses sustained on these transactions absent a specific Code
non-recognition provision.1
28
Clearly, the approach offered by the Court in Temple would sanction
realization in those transactions described by the Fifth Circuit.
Although concern over the approach endorsed in Temple is easily ad-
dressed with legislation restricting the deduction of losses resulting from
these types of transactions, 29 use of nonrecognition provisions in all such
cases is inconsistent with the original purpose of these provisions.,
124. Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
125. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Temple
court's view on the role of nonrecognition provisions.
126. 887 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1989).
127. 887 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1989).
128. San Antonio, 887 F.2d at 583. Cf. Home v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250, 255-56
(1945) (no gain or loss realized on sale of seat on commodities exchange; sale and earlier
purchase of identical seat treated as exchange of identical interests).
129. The Internal Revenue Code currently limits recognition of losses realized in con-
nection with a variety of transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267(a) (losses incurred in trans-
actions between related parties disallowed); I.R.C. § 1091(a) (losses incurred in wash
sales transactions disallowed); I.R.C. § 165(c) (certain losses incurred by individuals
disallowed).
130. For example, in considering § 112 of the Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
216, § 112, 48 Stat. 680, 704 (1934), the predecessor of current I.R.C. § 1031(a), the
Ways and Means Subcommittee observed that the like kind exchange rules were intended
to postpone recognition of gain or loss until such time as a "pure sale" occurred:
The underlying principle behind all of the exchange and reorganization provi-
sions of the present law is that they do not result in tax exemption, but that the
tax is postponed until a gain is realized from a pure sale or what amounts to a
pure sale. The reasons assigned for such a policy are: (1) that such provisions
prevent much of the uncertainty and litigation which was involved in the prior
income tax laws; (2) normal business adjustments will not be interfered with if
so-called "paper profits" are exempted; (3) the revenues of the Government will
be increased by preventing taxpayers from taking colorable losses.
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Of greater concern is the lack of attention given the substance of the
transaction by the two-part test announced in Temple. As noted by the
Supreme Court in Weiss, if the taxpayer does not receive a "thing really
different" from that exchanged, the transaction does not constitute a re-
alization event.'31 Although the Weiss Court found that the interests ex-
changed in that case were technically identical,132 a different result would
have been reached in that case had the Court focused on the formal ter-
mination of the taxpayer's interest in the old corporation. 3 3 Thus, Weiss
dictates that a disposition of property will trigger realization only if it
provides the taxpayer with something that is, in substance, "really and
truly different" than what was held before the exchange. 34 The ap-
proach advocated by the District Court in Temple fails to consider the
substance of an exchange transaction and therefore must be eliminated as
a means of evaluating exchange transactions.
2. Realization vs. Recognition: Conflicting Provisions
At first glance, the Supreme Court's endorsement of the "materially
different" limitation on realization appears to conflict with nonrecogni-
tion provisions found in the Code. 135 This observation, which was raised
by the taxpayer in Cottage Savings,136 suggests that limiting realization
by evaluating the properties subject to an exchange undermines these
nonrecognition provisions by doing what they were enacted to do: limit
the imposition of tax on gain or loss resulting from the exchange of simi-
lar properties. 37 Although the Supreme Court chose not to address this
H. R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
131. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
132. Id. at 254.
133. The taxpayer in Weiss did terminate his interest in the old corporation. See id. at
251. Consequently, notwithstanding the similarities between the two corporations, the
test adopted by the District Court in Temple would treat the Weiss transaction as a reali-
zation event.
134. See San Antonio Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 589 (5th Cir. 1989)
(citing Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924)). See also Sprouse v. Commissioner, 122
F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1941) (stock distribution is income only if it "effects a change in
the proportionate interests of the stockholders"); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A.
300, 304 (1941) (stock dividend does not constitute income "unless it (1) works a change
in the corporate entity, or (2) gives the stockholder an interest different in character from
that which his former holdings represented"). For the current statutory treatment of
stock dividends, see I.R.C. § 305 (1991).
135. See generally I.R.C. §§ 351, 354, 361, 721, 1031, 1035, 1036 (1991) (various pro-
visions in the Internal Revenue Code dealing with nonrecognition).
136. Brief for Petitioner at Part II.A.4 of the Argument, November 15, 1990, Cottage
Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965). See also San Antonio,
887 F.2d at 586 (taxpayer argued that the material difference standard undermines the
Code's nonrecognition provisions); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United
States, 694 F. Supp. 230, 247-48 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989)
(material difference test held inconsistent with the policy underlying the Code's nonrcc-
ognition provisions).
137. "Nonrecognition can also be envisioned as a refinement of the realization concept
if property is exchanged for other property that, although different in some respects, is
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issue in Cottage Savings, it was considered in other mortgage swap
cases. 1
38
For example, in Temple, the trial court refused to adopt the "material
difference" standard proposed by the government. 139 Although the court
held that the loans exchanged by Temple were not materially different, °
it concluded that this did not limit realization of gain or loss "' Rather,
the court observed that the Code anticipates that certain transactions
lacking economic substance may result in the realization of gain or loss,
and in that event nonrecognition provisions should be used to ensure that
recognition is postponed.' 42 The court relied on Treasury Regulation
Section 1.1002-1(a) as authority for this position, noting that nonrecogni-
tion provisions were enacted because property received in an exchange is
often "substantially a continuation of the old investment still
unliquidated."' 4 3
The nonrecogniton provisions of the Code are not the product of Con-
gressional efforts to ensure that a federal income tax is not imposed on
those exchange transactions lacking economic substance, as suggested by
Temple. Rather, these provisions were intended to provide taxpayers
with nonrecognition treatment whenever an exchange of qualifying
properties resulted in realized gain but yielded no cash profit.'" The
Treasury regulations do explain that nonrecognition treatment is avail-
able because differences between the properties exchanged "are more for-
mal than substantial,"' 45 but the legislative history of the nonrecognition
provisions suggests that economic substance was at best a minor concern
of lawmakers when these provisions were first included in the revenue
subject to substantially identical economic risks (eg. § 1031)." 2 B. Bittker & L Lokken,
Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 40.2, at 40-4 to 40-5 (2d ed. 1990).
138. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
139. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 230,
243-44 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989).
140. Temple, 694 F. Supp. at 245. The court held that the loans which qualified as
"substantially identical" for purposes of Memorandum R-49 were economic substitutes
for one another at the time of the transaction and therefore were not materially different.
See id.
141. Id. at 243.
142. "All of these [nonrecognition] sections specifically provide for nonrecognition of
realized gain or loss on the basis that the 'realized' gain or loss is the product of a sale or
other disposition of property which lacks true economic substance." Id. at 247.
143. Ia at 246-47 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c)(1951)). Apparently, the court was
concerned that applying a substance over form test to realization would undermine the
nonrecognition provisions. The Fifth Circuit in San Antonio responded:
The realization requirement of material difference does not undercut these Code
sections. It only provides a minimal standard that items exchanged may not be
identical, fungible commodities. Such nonrecognition provisions of the wash
sales rules (§ 1091) and the like exchange rules (§ 1031) are bright line rules
dealing with specific circumstances not necessarily addressed by the material
difference requirement of realization.
San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 586 (5th Cir. 1989).
144. See S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 11-12 (1921).
145. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1957).
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laws in 1921.146 The concept of realization, in contrast, does focus on the
substance of the transaction, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Weiss.'47 Thus, the reliance in Temple on nonrecognition provi-
sions as the sole means of limiting recognition of gain and loss on
fictitious transactions was misplaced.
A related argument raised by the taxpayer in Cottage Savings suggests
that those transactions specifically excluded from the scope of nonrecog-
nition provisions must result in realized and recognized gain or loss. 48
This argument is based on the fact that realization is a prerequisite to
recognition. 14 9 With realization established in transactions normally
qualifying for nonrecognition treatment, proponents of this position ar-
gue that Congressional action denying nonrecognition treatment evi-
dences lawmakers' intent to treat the transaction as taxable. 150 Because
denial of nonrecognition treatment has no effect on realization, gain or
loss should be realized and recognized.
146. Both the House and Senate reports accompanying the Revenue Act of 1921 indi-
cate that these nonrecognition provisions were enacted in response to concerns over tax-
ing exchanges that produced no cash profit, a result that inhibited business readjustment.
See H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1921); S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess., 11-12 (1921). However, the last sentence of each of these reports lends some sup-
port to the position taken by Treasury in its regulations with respect to economic sub-
stance: "It]he preceding amendments, if adopted, will, by removing a source of grave
uncertainty, not only permit business to go forward with the readjustments required by
existing conditions but will also considerably increase the revenue by preventing taxpayers
from taking colorable losses in wash sales and other fictitious exchanges." H.R. Rep. No.
350, 67th Cong., Ist Sess., 10 (1921) (emphasis added). See also supra note 129.
147. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924). "Under Weiss, a formal change in
ownership is not enough to trigger realization. In order for realization to occur, the party
to an exchange must receive something really different than he previously had." San
Antonio, 887 F.2d at 584.
148. See Brief for Petitioner at Part B of Argument Summary, Cottage Say. Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965). In its brief, Cottage Savings argued
that the loss realized on its exchange of mortgage loans should be recognized because
Congress specifically excluded debt instruments from the scope of the like kind exchange
rules when it enacted the predecessor to § 103 1(a)(2) in 1923. See id. (citing Rev. Act of
1923, Pub. L. No. 67-545, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 1560 (1923)).
149. Recognition provisions operate under the assumption that gain or loss has already
been realized. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F. Supp.
230, 241 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1002-1(a)); Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952); 2 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income.
Estates and Gifts 44.1.1, at 44-2 (2d ed. 1990).
150. See Brief for Petitioner at Part II.A.2 of the Argument, Cottage Say. Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965). Although the addition of current
§ 1031(a)(2) in 1923 had the effect of characterizing exchanges involving inventory,
stocks and bonds, notes, and other readily marketable assets as taxable events, the legisla-
tive history of the Revenue Act of 1923 suggests that the amendment was intended to
prevent taxpayers from deferring recognition of gain in situations involving the exchange
of assets having a readily ascertainable value for similar assets and cash. See H.R. Rep.
No. 1432, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 1-2 (1923) (which includes the text of a January 13, 1923
letter to William R. Green, acting Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, from
Treasury Secretary A.W. Mellon, explaining the purpose of the amendment to the like-
kind exchange rules).
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This position, however, fails to recognize that the scope of these non-
recognition provisions is different than that of the "materially different"
limitation on realization. There is some overlap, to be sure, but the like
kind exchange rules, for example, deal with a broader range of exchanges
than those subject to the "materially different" standard.' Thus, the
realization requirement is satisfied whenever an exchange of properties
qualifies for nonrecognition treatment under Section 1031(a). Con-
versely, no realized gain or loss results from such a transaction if, be-
cause of the similarities of the properties involved, the transaction is
treated as a substitution of identical properties failing to qualify as an
"exchange" or "disposition." '52 The "materially different" limitation on
realization must therefore be viewed not as another nonrecognition pro-
vision, but as a threshold question that considers whether the transaction
should be respected as an "exchange" or "other disposition" for tax
purposes.
3. The Treasury Regulation as Authority
Many of the taxpayers in the mortgage swap cases also argued that,
technically, the Court's reliance on Treasury's interpretation of the reali-
zation requirement was improper because a literal reading of the regula-
tion's language does not produce the "materially different" test
subsequently adopted by the Cottage Savings Court. 1 3 Although the
151. For example, when a taxpayer exchanges a farm used in his business for an unde-
veloped city lot he intends to hold for investment, gain or loss is realized on the exchange
because the two properties are "materially different," but no gain or loss is recognized
under I.R.C. § 1031(a) since the properties qualify under the like kind standard. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1967).
152. Both I.R.C. §§ 1031 and 1036 apply only to transactions qualifying as "ex-
changes." See I.R.C. §§ 1031(a)(1), 1036(a). The taxpayer in Cottage Savings offered a
related argument suggesting that Congress intended for mortgage swap transactions to
result in realization and recognition of gain and loss because they are specifically ex-
cluded from the scope of § 1031. See Brief for Petitioner at Part B of Argument Sum-
mary, Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, II S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965) (citing
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(1991)). According to the taxpayer, the fact that the like kind ex-
change rules initially allowed taxpayers to exclude gain on items now excluded under
§ 1031(a)(2) suggested that, when Congress specifically excluded these items from the
scope of § 1031, it intended for gain or loss from the exchange of these items to be recog-
nized. See id. The taxpayer supported its position by noting that the legislative history of
the Revenue Act of 1934 confirmed the tax treatment due exchanges of loans: "profit or
loss is recognized in the case of exchanges of notes or securities, which are essentially like
money." H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). According to the taxpayer,
the fact that Congress did not then, and has not since, changed the limitation on these
rules indicates that it intended for gain or loss from the exchange of those items to be
recognized. See Brief for Petitioner at Part B of Argument Summary, Cottage Sav. Ass'n
v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965).
This conclusion is correct, provided the gain or loss has been realized. Thus, the non-
recognition provisions do not establish that realization occurs as a result of every ex-
change. The concept of realization does do so, however, with respect to every transaction
that qualifies as an exchange for tax purposes.
153. See, eg., Brief for Petitioner at Part II.A.1 of the Argument, Cottage Say. Ass'n
v. Commissioner, Ill S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965).
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regulation does not expressly limit realization to transactions involving
the receipt of cash or materially different property,15 4 it does imply that
such a limitation exists. 155 Thus, any suggestion that the scope of Treas-
ury's "materially different" limitation on realization should be evaluated
solely by reference to the language used in the regulation should be dis-
missed as inconsistent with the spirit of the limitation.
A related argument raised by opponents of the "materially different"
standard suggested that judicial reliance on the regulation was improper
because the regulation was promulgated pursuant to Section 1001, a stat-
utory provision that is purely computational and that therefore does not
support an interpretive regulation seeking to limit the scope of realiza-
tion. "'56 Both the language of Section 1001(a)157 and its legislative his-
tory 5 establish that it is indeed a computational provision.159
Proponents of this position argued that Treasury's attempt to define the
parameters of realization in a regulation promulgated pursuant to a stat-
utory provision dealing solely with the computation of realized gain or
loss should be held invalid. Tax Court Judge Cohen subscribed to this
argument in her concurring opinion in Cottage Savings,"' as did the
Sixth Circuit when it considered the case on appeal.' 62
These arguments, however, failed to prevent the Supreme Court from
adopting Treasury's "materially different" test.' 63 Although the Court's
154. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 390-91 (1988), rev'd, 890 F.2d
848 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
155. See, e.g., Emery v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1948)(holding that regula-
tion did not apply to to an exchange of municipal refunding bonds for old bonds because
statute does not apply to municipal corporations).
156. See Cottage Savings, 90 T.C. at 403 (Cohen, J., concurring).
157. See supra note 22.
158. The legislative history of § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924, the predecessor of
§ 1001(a), provides that it was intended "to show clearly the method of determining the
amount of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property [and] merely embod-
ies in the law the present construction by the Department and the courts of the existing
law." S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
266, 275.
159. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957), (providing that gain realized on the sale or
exchange of property is included in gross income). According to this regulation, rules for
computing the gain are included in § 1001. See id.
160. See Brief for Petitioner at Part II.A.1 of the Argument, Cottage Say. Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (No. 89-1965).
161. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 403 (1988) (Cohen, J.,
concurring), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1503
(1991). Judge Cohen observed that earlier versions of Treas Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) condi-
tioned realization on an exchange involving materially different properties, but the cur-
rent provision does not. See id. (citing n.13 of the majority's opinion). Noting that the
controlling statute, § 1001(a), is a computation provision, she concluded that the under-
lying regulation must also be computational and therefore does not speak to realization.
See id. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with Judge Cohen and refused to support a
"materially different" limitation on realization. See Cottage Savings, 890 F.2d at 852.
162. See id.
163. See 111 S. Ct. at 1508.
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position on these issues is unknown,' the explanation offered by the
Fifth Circuit in San Antonio may reflect the Court's view on these issues:
It is true that Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) does not in its terms create
the requirement of material difference. The concept of realization is
what creates the material difference requirement.... Because the ma-
terial difference requirement is already inherent in the concept of reali-
zation, however, the "differing materially" language in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1001-1(a) may be read as a reference to an established requirement
rather than as establishing the requirement. 165
Thus, some limitation on realization based on the nature of the proper-
ties involved in the exchange is appropriate. What remains is to deter-
mine whether the Supreme Court's method of limitation, a test based on
a comparison of the legal rights relinquished and received in an ex-
change, furthers the goal of distinguishing between true exchanges and
those that are in substance substitutions of identical assets deserving no
recognition as exchanges for tax purposes.
IV. APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT'S "LEGAL
ENTITLEMENTS" TEST
A. Evaluating the Legal Entitlements Theory
The Supreme Court held in Cottage Savings that an evaluation of the
"legal entitlements" associated with properties involved in an exchange is
necessary to determine whether such properties satisfy the "materially
different" standard found in the Treasury Regulations. 66 Relying on its
landmark realization decisions, the Court concluded that "Phellis, Marr
and Weiss stand for the principle that properties are 'different' in the
sense that is 'material' to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their
respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or
extent."1
67
Although the Court offered no definition of "legal entitlements," it did
offer examples to assist in determining when these legal entitlements dif-
fer in kind or extent:
[s]eparate groups of stock are not materially different if they confer
'the same proportional interest of the same character in the same cor-
poration.' However, they are materially different if they are issued by
different corporations, or if they confer 'differen[t] rights and powers'
164. The Cottage Savings Court failed to mention these issues in its opinion. See id.
165. San Antonio Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 586 (5th Cir. 1989)(em-
phasis in original).
166. See Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503, 1511 (1991). See also
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. Cf. Allen v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 716, 719
(2d Cir. 1931) ("It may be that the transaction was not an 'exchange' ... though it was
certainly not very different: but the question whether a profit ensues depends not so much
upon whether one chattel is exchanged for another as upon what are the rights of the
taxpayer before and after the transaction under consideration.").
167. Cottage Savings, Ill S. Ct. at 1510.
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in the same corporation. No more demanding a standard than this is
necessary in order to satisfy the administrative purposes underlying the
realization requirement in § 1001(a).1 68
The Court's description of the legal entitlements test suggests that an
exchange transaction will result in realized gain or loss unless the proper-
ties involved are "the same." This conclusion is buttressed by language
later in the Court's opinion summarizing the new test: "For, as long as
the property entitlements are not identical, their exchange will allow
both the commissioner and the transacting taxpayer easily to fix the ap-
preciated or depreciated values of the property relative to their tax ba-
ses."' 169  Thus, the Court's endorsement of Treasury's "materially
different" standard amounts to an affirmation of the holding in Weiss
that a substitution of identical properties will not be treated as a realiza-
tion event. 70 Materiality apparently plays no role in the determination,
based on the examples provided by the Cottage Savings Court.
The Court may have focused on "legal entitlements" in Cottage Sav-
ings as a means of applying its decisions in Weiss and Marr to other
property exchange cases. As noted by the Marr Court during its discus-
sion of the result in Weiss, "[tiechnically there was a new entity; but the
corporate identity was deemed to have been substantially maintained be-
cause the new corporation was organized under the laws of the same
State, with presumably the same powers as the old."'' Thus, the tax-
payer in Weiss received stock in a different corporation, but because both
corporations were organized in the same state, the transaction did not
leave the taxpayer with legal entitlements different from those held prior
to the transaction.' 72 The same cannot be said for the taxpayer in Marr,
for although the transaction resulted in no change in the identity of the
business, the "legal entitlements" associated with the stock received in
the exchange were different from those given up because the corporations
were organized in different states. 17' Thus, the Cottage Savings Court's
focus on "legal entitlements" allowed it to justify and rely on its earlier
decisions in Weiss and Marr in developing a test for applying the "mate-
rially different" standard.
74
By adopting an approach that focuses on the legal rights associated
with the properties exchanged, the Court rejected the government's "eco-
168. Id. (citations omitted).
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
171. Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541 (1925). See supra note 100.
172. See Weiss, 265 U.S. at 253.
173. See Marr, 268 U.S. at 541.
174. The Cottage Savings Court also cited Phellis in support of this conclusion. See
Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503, 1510 (1991). Although the Phellis
Court did evaluate the interest received by a taxpayer using a "materially different" stan-
dard, the case did not involve an exchange since the taxpayer did not relinquish the stock
previously held. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921). Consequently, Phellis
does not provide direct support for the test developed by the Court in Cottage Savings.
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nomic substitute" theory. 75 The government argued that "differences
between properties are material for purposes of the Code only when it
can be said that the parties, the relevant market (in this case the secon-
dary mortgage market), and the relevant regulatory body (in this case the
FHLBB) would consider them material."' 76 The Court rejected this ap-
proach, concluding that it was inconsistent with supporting case law, es-
tablished nonrecognition provisions, and the underlying purpose of the
realization requirement. 77
B. Applying the Court's "'Legal Entitlements" Test
As with any test, the "materially different" standard must provide rea-
sonable and predictable results in order to justify its continued use. Pre-
sumably, the Cottage Savings Court focused on the legal entitlements
associated with the properties exchanged as a means of ensuring that the
"materially different" test would provide results consistent with those
obtained in Phellis, Weiss, and Marr. "I Use of the "legal entitlements"
test produced justifiable results in Cottage Savings and Centennial, and
appears to lend support to tax treatment currently afforded other ex-
change transactions.
For example, Section 1036 of the Code provides that the exchange of
common stock for common stock of the same corporation does not result
in the recognition of gain or loss.'7 9 A similar result is obtained in ex-
changes involving preferred stock of the same corporation.' Although
the presence of this provision suggests that realization has occurred,'
this type of transaction does not constitute an exchange triggering reali-
zation because the recipient is not left with legal rights different from
those relinquished.'8 2 Consequently, the Supreme Court's "legal entitle-
175. See Cottage Savings, II S. Ct. at 1510-11.
176. Id. at 1510.
177. See id. at 1510-11. The Court concluded that the purpose of the nonrecognition
provision-to provide a measure of administrative convenience-was not furthered by
adoption of the government's complex "economic substitute" approach. See id. In San
Antonio, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the government's "economic benefit" approach
would often produce unjustifiable results. See San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner,
887 F.2d 577, 590 (5th Cir. 1989). The court illustrated its conclusion with the following
example:
[I]f two taxpayers exchanged two bonds of different corporate entities engaged
in entirely different businesses, but which have the same rating by Moody's, the
same interest rate, the same cash flow, the same maturity and the same value in
the capital market then no change in their "economic status" would have oc-
curred. The transaction, would, nevertheless be real, and the taxpayer should
not be able to postpone losses and gains while switching bonds or other assets
merely because they are "economic substitutes."
Id.
178. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
179. I.R.C. § 1036(a) (1991).
180. See id.
181. See supra note 149.
182. This conclusion is consistent with that of the Supreme Court in Weiss: the ex-
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ments" test provides results in this area consistent with those currently
available from nonrecognition provisions included in the Code.183
Results obtained through an application of the "legal entitlements"
test also are consistent with those available under current law that deal
with the exchange of partnership interests. The exchange of a general
partnership interest for a limited partnership interest (or a limited inter-
est for a general interest) in the same partnership provides the recipient
with legal entitlements far different than those relinquished.' 8 4 Conse-
quently, this type of transaction should be characterized as an exchange
of materially different property interests that results in realized gain or
loss.
The current position of the Internal Revenue Service on the exchange
of partnership interests appears to acknowledge that the differences be-
tween a general and limited partnership interest justify characterization
of the transaction as a realization event. In Revenue Ruling 84-52, the
Service ruled that the receipt of a limited partnership interest by an ex-
isting partner in exchange for that partner's general partnership interest
does not result in the recognition of gain or loss.'8 5 By relying on a non-
recognition provision, Section 721 of the Internal Revenue Code, 8 6 the
Service implicitly acknowledged that the transaction triggers realized
gain or loss. 187 Thus, application of the "materially different" test pro-
vides results that are consistent with those available under current law.
Although the Court's focus on "legal entitlements" appears to produce
justifiable outcomes in a number of property exchange transactions, en-
dorsement of the test may yield unexpected results in other types of
transactions. Consider the following examples.
1. Bond Refinancing Transactions
The courts have held that in most cases, the receipt of bonds issued to
replace outstanding bonds will result in the realization of gain or loss.
change of stock for stock in what is, in substance, the same corporation, is not a realiza-
tion event. See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
183. Application of the "legal entitlements" test to other stock-for-stock exchange
transactions confirms that most are properly treated as realization events. For example,
an exchange of common stock for preferred stock leaves the recipient with legal rights
different than those enjoyed prior to the exchange. Consequently, this type of exchange is
properly characterized as a realization event, a conclusion implicitly acknowledged in
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E), which characterizes this type of exchange as a tax-free reorganiza-
tion. See Rev. Rul. 77-238, 1977-2 C.B. 115.
184. For example, a general partner is entitled to participate in management decisions
affecting the business of the partnership, while a limited partner has no such entitlement.
Compare Unif. Part. Act § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) with Rev. Unif. Ltd. Part. Act
§ 303(b) (1976).
185. See Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157-58.
186. I.R.C. § 721(a) (1991) provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a part-
ner or partnership on the contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an
interest in the partnership. An analysis of the Service's reliance on § 721(a) in this con-
text is beyond the scope of this article.
187. See Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B., 157-58.
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Thus, in Emery v. Commissioner,18 the Second Circuit held that gain
was realized on the exchange of City of Philadelphia bonds for newly-
issued refunding bonds issued by the City.'89 Noting that the interest
rate, maturity and call dates, and fair market values of the bonds dif-
fered, the Court concluded that the bonds exchanged were materially
different, thus satisfying the test announced in Weiss v. Steam and em-
bodied in Treasury Regulation Section 29.111-l."9°
The Board of Tax Appeals relied on the same authority to reach a
different result in Motor Products Corp. v. Commissioner.'9' In Motor
Products, the taxpayer exchanged City of Detroit bonds then in default
for newly-issued refunding bonds.192 With the exception of an extended
maturity date, the terms of the refunding bonds were identical to those of
the original bonds. 193 Relying on Weiss, the Board held that the bonds
received were substituted for those previously held, given the similarity
of the two bond issues.' 94 While conceding that the city retained the
right to call the bonds prior to maturity, the Board concluded that the
difference in maturity dates was, as a practical matter, irrelevant.'"9 The
Board held that the taxpayer realized no gain or loss on the receipt of the
new bonds.
196
Use of the Supreme Court's "legal entitlements" test produces results
consistent with those obtained by the courts in these refinancing cases.
The bonds exchanged by the taxpayer in Emery were "materially differ-
ent" because bonds having different terms necessarily provide the holder
with different legal rights. 19 7 In contrast, the transaction described in
188. 166 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1948).
189. See id. at 29.
190. See id. Accord Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 166 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1948).
See also Watson v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 569, 581-82 (1947) (differences in terms of debt
certificates held sufficient to justify exchange treatment); Rev. Rul. 73-558, 1973-2 C.B.
298 (exchange of mortgage loan pools bearing different rates of interest treated as a taxa-
ble exchange).
191. 47 B.T.A. 983, 997-99 (1942), acq., 1946-I C.B. 3. See also City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Hoey, 52 F. Supp. 665, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (reaching an identical result
with respect to a similar exchange of City of Detroit bonds).
192. See Motor Products, 47 B.T.A. at 992.
193. See id. at 997.
194. See id. at 998. The Board offered the following explanation:
The city assumed no additional obligation under the refunding agreement or
upon the refunding bonds, series A, since upon the consummation of the re-
funding agreement through the issuance of such series A bonds there existed the
same debtor, the same principal amount of indebtedness, the same rate of inter-
est thereon, the same provision for a sinking fund, and the same creditors. Cer-
tainly, from the standpoint of the city of Detroit the essence of the 1934
transaction was an exchange constituting merely a substitution of the evidence
of the same continuing debt.
Id. at 996.
195. See Motor Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 983, 997 (1942).
196. See id. The Service reached the same conclusion when it considered similar facts
in Rev. Rul. 54, 1954-1 C.B. 204.
197. For example, a difference in interest rates provides the holder with a legal entitle-
ment to more (or less) interest income. Similarly, a change in maturity dates entitles the
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Motor Products did not involve materially different properties because
the terms of the obligations exchanged were in substance identical and
therefore provided the recipient with no new legal rights.19 8 These two
cases illustrate that changes in the terms of an obligation made during
the refinancing process will provide the recipient with different legal
rights which, under the legal entitlements test, will justify treatment of
the transaction as a taxable exchange.199
Consider, however, the position taken by the Internal Revenue Service
in Revenue Ruling 73-160." In this ruling, the Service concluded that
the voluntary subordination of a portion of an outstanding obligation by
a major noteholder, accompanied by an extension of the maturity date,
did not constitute a taxable event.20 ' The decision, which was based on
an application of the "materially different" standard,20 2 suggests that the
additional security offered by a subordination agreement does not leave
noteholders with property different enough to justify a departure from
the result reached in Motor Products.
Revenue Ruling 73-160 provides a different result than that obtained
through a comparison of the legal entitlements enjoyed by noteholders
before and after the transaction. As a result of the change in terms de-
scribed in the ruling, noteholders are entitled to receive interest over a
longer period of time-a legal right not diminished by the presence of an
unlimited call provision such as that found in Motor Products.20 3 In ad-
dition, the subordination agreement ensures that noteholders will be re-
paid in full before any payments are made to a major creditor. Given
these new legal entitlements, the notes received in the transaction de-
scribed in Revenue Ruling 73-160 are materially different and therefore
are the subject of a taxable exchange.
holder to interest income over a longer (or shorter) period of time. But cf Motor Prod-
ucts, 47 B.T.A. 983, 997 (1942) (difference in maturity dates irrelevant where the princi-
pal terms of the refunding bonds were identical to those of the original bonds), discussed
supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 197.
199. See generally Winterer, "Reissuance" and Deemed Exchanges Generally, 37 Tax
Lawyer 509 (1983). But cf. Newberry v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 576, 581 (1945)
(exchange of bonds bearing different interest rates held not a taxable event). Given the
legal entitlement to a different rate of interest, the Supreme Court's test would change the
result in this case.
200. 1973-1 C.B. 365. In Rev. Rul. 73-160, the debtor corporation proposed that the
maturity date of its outstanding notes be extended by agreement with existing notehold-
ers. The corporation asked noteholders to deliver outstanding notes to an intermediary
for the purpose of attaching a copy of the agreement and additional interest coupons
(bearing interest at the rate originally specified in the notes). The intermediary then re-
turned the notes to their respective owners. See id.
201. See id.
202. The IRS observed that "[w]here the changes are so material as to amount virtu-
ally to the issuance of a new security, the same income tax consequences should follow as
if the new security were actually issued." Id.
203. See Motor Products, 47 B.T.A. 983, 997 (1942). See also supra note 195 and ac-
companying text.
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2. Exercising Conversion Rights
Conversion rights granted to the holder of corporate debt securities are
exercised by exchanging debt securities for that number of shares of
stock specified in the conversion provision of the debt instrument. This
exchange of debt for stock necessarily involves different property inter-
ests; the legal entitlements enjoyed by a bondholder are considerably dif-
ferent than those attributable to the interest of a stockholder. 2°
Consequently, the "materially different" test endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Cottage Savings would characterize an exchange of debt for
stock as a realization event.
The Treasury Department established its position on the tax conse-
quences associated with the exercise of conversion rights with the follow-
ing policy, which was adopted in regulations promulgated under the
Revenue Act of 1918:
Where the owner of a bond exercises the right, provided for in the
bond, of converting the bond into stock in the obligor corporation,
such transaction does not result in a realization of profit or loss, the
transaction not being closed for purposes of income taxation until such
stock is sold.205
Although this language never again appeared in the regulations, Treas-
ury renewed the policy in a series of pronouncements 2° and later estab-
lished its position through the issuance of Revenue Ruling 72-265.207
Clearly, the tax treatment endorsed by the government in this ruling pro-
duces results far different from those obtained by applying the "materi-
ally different" standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Cottage
Savings.
The Internal Revenue Service takes a similar position with respect to
debt-for-debt exchanges occasioned by the exercise of conversion rights.
In Revenue Ruling 57-535,208 the Service considered the question
whether the receipt of 1.5% five-year Treasury Notes, pursuant to the
exercise of a conversion provision included in the issuance terms of
nonmarketable 2.75% bonds that were relinquished in the exchange,
constituted a realization event. 209 Apparently relying on the fact that the
conversion rights exercised were granted when the bonds were issued,2"'
204. For example, when a corporation liquidates or files for protection from creditors
under bankruptcy laws, a bondholder will be repaid in full before any payments are made
to stockholders with respect to their equity investment in the corporation. See Sinking
Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 722 (1878).
205. Treas. Reg. No. 45, Art. 1563, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 393 (1919).
206. See Mimeograph 3156, C.B. 11-2, 24 (1923) and Gen. Couns. Mem. 18,436, 1937-
1 C.B. 101, both of which confirmed that Treasury would continue to treat the exercise of
conversion rights as a nontaxable transaction notwithstanding the omission of its policy
on this question from the regulations.
207. 1972-1 C.B. 222.
208. 1957-2 C.B. 513.
209. See id. at 514.
210. The IRS used the same argument to justify tax-free treatment of debt-for-stock
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the Service characterized the debt-for-debt exchange as a "transforma-
tion" rather than a disposition. Thus, no gain or loss was realized.2 1
Given changes in both the interest rate212 and the nature of the rights
held by the taxpayer (conversion from nonmarketable to marketable in-
terest) that follow from the exchange described in the ruling, the
Supreme Court's "legal entitlements" test would treat this transaction as
an exchange of materially different properties resulting in realized gain or
loss.
3. Partitioning Interests in Property
When title to property is held jointly by two or more persons, each
owns an undivided interest in the entire property and each interest is
subject to certain rights held by the other co-owners.213 Consequently,
the exchange of an interest in jointly held property for a different interest
in the same property may be considered a realization event under Treas-
ury's "materially different" standard if the transaction results in a change
in each co-owner's legal rights with respect to the property.
Currently, however, certain transactions involving jointly owned prop-
erty are not treated as exchanges for federal income tax purposes. For
example, joint owners who buy out the interest of one owner by repur-
chasing the jointly owned property at a partition sale realize no gain or
loss on the sale.2" 4 Similarly, a sale and repurchase of property at public
auction by current co-owners for the purpose of perfecting title is not a
taxable event, provided the proceeds of the sale are distributed to the co-
owners in proportion to their respective interests.215 The result in each
of these two scenarios is consistent with that obtained by application of
Treasury's "materially different" standard: the co-owners are left with
legal entitlements identical to those they enjoyed prior to the transaction,
and therefore they have not received property interests materially differ-
ent from those relinquished. 16
exchanges resulting from the exercise of conversion rights. See supra notes 205-07 and
accompanying text.
211. See 1957-2 C.B. at 516. The Service concluded that "[i]n substance and effect, he
continued to own the same property, its form being changed pursuant to a right embod-
ied in it when he acquired it." Id.
212. A change in the interest rate was enough to justify characterization of a debt-for-
debt exchange as a realization event in Emery v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 27, 29 (2d Cir.
1948). See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
213. See generally R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property
§§ 5.1-5.16 (1984)(discussing partition and property rights of co-tenants).
214. See Rev. Rul. 55-77, 1955-1 C.B. 339.
215. See Rev. Rul. 55-179, 1955-1 C.B. 340.
216. Although the co-owners described in the first scenario are left with a larger undi-
vided interest in the property as a result of the transaction, their legal rights with respect
to the property are identical. In the second scenario, the rights of each co-owner are
enhanced by the public sale in the sense that the action results in perfected title, but in
measuring the change in legal rights against a property owner's expectation of perfect
title, such an action merely places the owner in the position originally bargained for and
therefore should not be treated as an enhancement of legal rights.
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The conversion of property held in joint tenancy to a tenancy in com-
mon, either by agreement or by an action of partition under state law, for
the purpose of eliminating survivorship rights, also is not a taxable event
under current law.217 Yet, the elimination of survivorship rights effects a
significant change in the legal rights of joint owners of property, 1 s and
based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the materially different
requirement in Cottage Savings, this change in "legal entitlements"
would justify characterization of this transaction as a realization event.
Presumably, this result was not contemplated by the Court in Cottage
Savings when it developed the "legal entitlements" test.
Finally, consider a partition of property by co-owners that vests in
each owner a fee simple interest in a portion of the parcel previously held
in co-ownership. The legal rights enjoyed by the owner of a fee simple
interest in property are considerably different than those of a co-owner of
property. 219 Based on the reasoning of Cottage Savings, this difference in
legal entitlements triggers realization because the interests exchanged are
deemed "materially different."220 Two rulings issued by the Internal
Revenue Service support this conclusion by holding that nonrecognition
217. See Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 C.B. 507.
218. When property is held in joint tenancy, the death of one tenant results in a trans-
fer of a complete interest in the property to the survivor. R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck
& D. Whitman, The Law of Property § 5.3, at 207 (1984). This legal right is relinquished
when survivorship rights are eliminated through a conversion of the joint tenancy to a
tenancy in common because, on the death of a co-owner of property held as a tenancy in
common, the property interest passes to the cotenant's heirs by will or intestate succes-
sion. See id. § 5.2, at 198-99. Thus, the elimination of survivorship rights effects a signifi-
cant change in the legal entitlements previously enjoyed by the surviving co-tenant.
219. The owner of a fee simple interest in property enjoys rights that are subject to no
other person. See id. § 2.2, at 33. In contrast, the owner of an interest in property held in
joint tenancy or tenancy in common has an undivided interest in the entire property that
is subject to the rights of the other cotenants, see id. §§ 5.2-5.3, at 196-207, and is subject
to fiduciary standards imposed for the benefit of the other cotenants. See id. § 5.10, at
225.
220. Consider, however, the tax treatment afforded divisions of community property
between spouses. Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 1041 in 1984, an equal division of
community property between spouses was not treated as a taxable event. See Carrieres v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959, 964 (1975). Similarly, an unequal division of community
property which left each spouse with property having a value approximately equal to one-
half of the value of the community property was treated as nontaxable. See, e.g., Wren v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 290, 293 (1965) (where parties divide community prop-
erty equally, such an agreement is not taxable); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718,
719 (1935) (same). Cf. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (approximately equal division
of the total value of jointly owned property in a noncommunity property state is a non-
taxable division of property). The interests exchanged in these transactions would be
classified as "materially different" based on the legal entitlements theory used by the
Supreme Court in Cottage Savings, given the difference in legal rights enjoyed by the
spouses after the division of property. Although application of the "materially different"
standard to exchanges of property between spouses would have changed the result
reached in these early cases, the result is now based on legislation codified as I.R.C.
§ 1041: no gain or loss is recognized on the transfer of property by an individual to a
spouse, or to a former spouse if the transfer is incident to divorce. I.R.C. § 1041(a)
(1991).
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treatment is available under Section 1031 of the Code to parties involved
in similar exchange transactions. 2
4. Exchange of Interest in Trust for Trust Assets
Until recently, the tax consequences associated with the exchange of
an interest in an investment trust for assets of the trust was well settled.
Case law established that the equitable interest in trust assets held by a
certificate holder was sufficiently different from legal ownership of the
underlying assets to justify treatment of the transaction as a realization
event.2 2 2 The Internal Revenue Service agreed with this conclusion in a
ruling involving similar facts.22 3
Recently, the Service changed its position on the tax treatment of these
transactions. In Revenue Ruling 90-7,224 the Service held that the owner
of an interest in an investment trust is treated as the owner of an undi-
vided interest in the trust's assets.2 25 As an owner of trust assets, a certif-
icate holder realizes no gain or loss on an exchange of trust certificates
for trust assets, according to the ruling, because "the exchange effect[s]
no material difference in [the taxpayer's] position. 226
The position taken by the Service in Revenue Ruling 90-7 is inconsis-
221. See Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 301; Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265, 266
discussed supra note 226.
222. See Commissioner v. Tew, 108 F.2d 570, 571 (6th Cir. 1940); Du Bois Young v.
Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 648, 651-52 (1936).
223. See Rev. Rul. 68-633, 1968-2 C.B. 329, 330.
224. Rev. Rul. 90-7, 1990-1 C.B. 153.
225. See id. at 154. Relying on Rev. Rul. 84-10, 1984-1 C.B. 155 (mortgage pool cer-
tificate holder is treated as owner of undivided interest in pool under I.R.C. § 671), the
Service held that, for tax purposes, an investment trust certificate holder is treated as the
owner of the assets of the trust. See Rev. Rul. 90-7, 1990-1 C.B. at 154. Cf. Rev. Rul. 85-
13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (grantor treated as the owner of a trust under I.R.C. § 671 is consid-
ered the owner of the trust assets for federal income tax purposes).
Commentators and the courts have criticized the IRS for its use of the Grantor Trust
Rules (I.R.C. §§ 671-679) in this manner. See generally Ascher, When to Ignore Grantor
Trusts: The Precedents, a Proposal, and a Prediction, 41 Tax L. Rev. 252 (1986) (conclud-
ing that I.R.S. decisions on whether to ignore or respect the separate existence of grantor
trusts have been inconsistent).
226. 1990-1 C.B. at 154. This is similar to the conclusion reached by the Service with
respect to the severance of a property interest held by co-owners, each of whom owns an
undivided interest in the entire property prior to severance. See supra note 217 and ac-
companying text.
Both rulings cited by the Service involved the exchange of trust certificates for an inter-
est in each of the trust assets. If such a transaction involved the exchange of trust certifi-
cates for one of a number of trust assets, it seems clear that the resulting change in legal
rights would trigger realization. Support for this conclusion is found in Rev. Rul. 73-
476, 1973-2 C.B. 301. In that ruling, the Service held that a partition of three parcels of
real property between three co-owners qualified for nonrecognition treatment under
I.R.C. § 1031(a). Implicit in the Service's conclusion is the fact that the exchange of an
undivided interest in three prop,-rties for a complete interest in one property constitutes a
realization event. See supra note 149; see also Rev. Rul. 79-44, 1979-1 C.B. 265, 266
(exchange of undivided interest in two parcels of land by taxpayer for complete interest in
one of the two parcels held within the scope of I.R.C. § 1031(a)).
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tent with the result obtained by using Treasury's "materially different"
standard. The exchange of trust certificates for trust assets is an ex-
change of materially different interests in property because it gives the
owner different "legal entitlements." 7 Thus, this transaction involves
materially different property which, under Treasury Regulation Section
1.1001-1(a), results in realized gain or loss.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's endorsement of the Treasury Department's "ma-
terially different" standard in Cottage Savings represents its attempt to
provide a framework within which the tax treatment of property ex-
changes may be evaluated. Consistent with the Court's decisions in three
landmark realization cases, the test endorsed by the Court treats any ex-
change of materially different properties as a taxable event resulting in
realized gain or loss.228
The "legal entitlements" test developed by the Cottage Savings Court
brings some measure of predictability to an uncertain and infrequently
used standard of federal taxation. By comparing the legal rights held by
taxpayers before and after an exchange, the Court identified those char-
acteristics of a property transaction that most accurately establish
whether the transaction is in substance an exchange of different interests
in property.
22 9
With the Court's development of this test, however, comes inevitable
uncertainty. Although application of the Court's "legal entitlements"
test to Treasury's "materially different" standard provides justifiable and
predictable results in many cases, it actually alters the current tax treat-
ment of other types of transactions. A partition of joint property inter-
ests,230 the receipt of stock for convertible debt securities,"' and the
exchange of investment trust certificates for trust assets 232 are examples
of previously tax-free transactions that become realization events by rea-
son of the approach announced by the Court in Cottage Savings. No
doubt other transactions that presently enjoy tax-free treatment will be
similarly affected. Thus, it is likely that the sudden potential for change
that follows from the Cottage Savings decision will generate disputes and
litigation in the absence of action by lawmakers or the Treasury Depart-
ment to clarify the tax treatment of these and other exchange
transactions.
227. For example, the legal rights of a certificate holder do not include the right to sell
trust assets, a right enjoyed by the certificate holder after exchanging certificates for trust
assets.
228. See supra notes 60-101 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 118.
230. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
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